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Abstract 1 
There has been a radical transformation in the provision of adult residential and nursing 2 
home care in England over the past four decades. Up to the 1980s, over 80% of adult 3 
residential care was provided by the public sector, but today public sector facilities account 4 
for only 8% of the available places, with the rest being provided by a mixture of for-profit 5 
firms (74%) and non-profit charities (18%). The public sector’s role is often now that of 6 
purchaser (paying the fees of people unable to afford them) and regulator. While the idea 7 
that private companies may play a bigger role in the future provision of health care is 8 
highly contentious in the UK, the transformation of the residential and nursing home care 9 
has attracted little comment.  Concerns about the quality of care do emerge from time to 10 
time, often stimulated by high profile media investigations, scandals or criminal 11 
prosecutions, but there is little or no evidence about whether or not the transformation of 12 
the sector from largely public to private provision has had a beneficial effect on those who 13 
need the service.  This study asks whether there are differences in the quality of care 14 
provided by public, non-profit or for-profit facilities in England.  We use data on care 15 
quality for over 15,000 homes that are provided by the industry regulator in England: the 16 
Care Quality Commission (CQC).  These data are the results of inspections carried out 17 
between April 2011 and October 2015.  Controlling for a range of facility characteristics 18 
such as age and size, proportional odds logistic regression showed that for-profit facilities 19 
have lower CQC quality ratings than public and non-profit providers over a range of 20 
measures, including safety, effectiveness, respect, meeting needs and leadership. We 21 
discuss the implications of these results for the ongoing debates about the role of for-profit 22 
providers of health and social care. 23 
 24 
Keywords: residential care; nursing homes; ownership; quality of care; facility regulation 25 
and control; public sector; public services; quasi-markets; England 26 
  27 
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The quasi-market for adult residential care in the UK: Do for-profit, not-for-profit or 28 
public sector residential care and nursing homes provide better quality care? 29 
Introduction 30 
Many countries are facing the challenge of providing health and social care to populations 31 
containing increasing proportions of elderly people. In the UK, for example, there are 32 
expected to be 3.2 million people over the age of 85 by 2034, more than double the number 33 
today (ONS 2015).  In addition, it is expected that a high proportion of elderly people will 34 
be living on their own, a factor strongly associated with the need to move into a residential 35 
or nursing care home.  Faced with increasing fiscal pressures, many governments have 36 
been considering alternatives to public provision of health and social care. Up to the 1980’s 37 
over 80% of adult residential care was provided by the public sector, but today public 38 
sector facilities account for only 8% of the available places, with the rest being provided by 39 
a mixture of for-profit firms (74%) and non-profit charities (18%). The public sector’s role 40 
is often now that of purchaser (paying the fees of people unable to afford them) and 41 
regulator. 42 
In essence, then, residential and nursing care outside of hospitals in the UK, once provided 43 
mainly by the public sector, has been turned into a form of quasi-market, differing from a 44 
conventional market in that a significant number of providers are not-for-profit 45 
organizations and by the fact that a large proportion of the individuals who use residential 46 
and nursing care do not purchase the service directly; the state acts as purchaser on their 47 
behalf. (LeGrand and Bartlett 1993).  Even in these cases, though, the individual member of 48 
the public has considerable freedom of choice as to where they will receive their residential 49 
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or nursing home care and significant numbers of people pay some or all of the cost of their 50 
care themselves.  51 
Despite the fact that the marketization of residential care is so well advanced in the UK, 52 
there has been little UK-based research into the quality of care provided by for-profit 53 
providers as contrasted to that enjoyed by residents in local authority or non-profit 54 
operated facilities.  The main question answered by this paper, then, is whether there are 55 
differences in the quality of care provided in adult residential and nursing home facilities in 56 
England depending on whether the facility is operated by a local authority, a not-for-profit 57 
organization, or a for-profit business.  While this is an important question in its own right, 58 
we also discuss the extent to which is might inform broader debates about the impact of 59 
market-like structures in health and social care more broadly. 60 
Theory  61 
The current arrangements by which residential and nursing home care is provided to 62 
adults in England can be called a quasi-market (LeGrand and Bartlett 1993).  Such 63 
arrangements are similar to conventional markets in that the provision of goods or services 64 
is the outcome of an economic exchange between two parties, a provider and a purchaser, 65 
and in that there is some sort of competition among the set of providers. Quasi-markets 66 
differ from conventional markets in that some of the providers are not necessarily 67 
motivated by a desire to maximise profits; there may be publicly owned or non-profit 68 
organizations involved as well.  Quasi-markets differ also in that at least some of the 69 
purchasing is done not by the individual service users, but by a public body acting on their 70 
behalf.  In the case of care homes, significant numbers of residents are paying their own 71 
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fees (41% in the UK in 2014), but most facilities have both self-pay and state-funded 72 
residents LaingBuisson (2014).  73 
Quasi-markets have been replacing organization by government bureaucracies in several 74 
areas of public sector in the UK over several decades, including education, health, and 75 
social care.  The rationale for the change is that, it is claimed, quasi-markets will prove 76 
superior to bureaucratic control in one or more of the following respects (Bartlett and 77 
LeGrand 1993). First, services may be delivered more efficiently, in the sense that an 78 
equivalent standard of service is delivered at a lower cost.  However, given that standards 79 
may be difficult to evaluate, a common concern of critics of marketization is that reductions 80 
in cost will be achieved by means of a reduction in standards.  Second, private providers 81 
may be more responsive to user needs than their public sector counterparts.  In contrast to 82 
possibly monopolistic public sector providers, the introduction of competition creates 83 
incentives to innovate and adapt to consumer needs and hence improved standards of care 84 
should follow.  Third, quasi-markets are often associated with increasing the choice 85 
available to users.  It might be that the availability of choice is intrinsically desirable, and it 86 
is in any case a logical requirement for there to be competition among providers.  Choice 87 
might be associated with differentiation in the types of provision available, for example by 88 
size, geography and level of care provided. 89 
In order to deliver these benefits it is necessary that there is an element of competition 90 
among providers, with at least some risk that those providers that fail to attract sufficient 91 
users, or are unable to operate within budgetary constraints, will be forced to cease 92 
operating.  Competition is the essential mechanism by which quasi-markets differ from 93 
bureaucracies.  It is particularly important that there is effective competition when, as in 94 
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the case of residential care, there is a preponderance of for-profit providers. Such 95 
businesses, it is conventional to assume, are motivated by a desire to maximise profit.  96 
Their desire to provide high quality care would, therefore, be the result of the expectation 97 
that they would only be able to attract residents by offering a sufficiently high quality of 98 
service.  Hart (1999) has pointed out that, where consumers purchase a service direct from 99 
a provider, assuming they are well informed, competition produces the expectation that 100 
for-profit providers will be of higher quality because they have a greater incentive to 101 
innovate than do public sector providers.  However, the care home market is more complex 102 
than this because, while some residents do indeed purchase their care directly from the 103 
provider with no government involvement, others are in places that are funded by their 104 
local authority.  105 
It has been argued that profit-maximizing may not be an accurate characterisation of the 106 
motivation of some private providers in this sector (Knapp et al. 2001; Kendall et al. 2003).  107 
For example, small business owners may have a “mercantile” motivation: they place value 108 
on the independence and sense of autonomy that derives from running their own business.  109 
The existence of heterogeneous motivations among for-profit providers may make the 110 
distinction between care homes in different sectors less clear cut.   111 
The motivation of providers from the public and non-profit sectors is also unclear.  112 
Certainly in the case of non-profit providers that are charities, we might think that their 113 
motivation is to provide high quality care and therefore that they would strive to do so 114 
even in the absence of competition, assuming that there are enforceable restrictions on 115 
their ability to distribute any surpluses to owners, employees or trustees (Hirth 1999; 116 
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Grabowski & Hirth 2003).  They may not even need to break even financially if they have 117 
alternative, philanthropic sources of finance. 118 
Is there reason to believe that competition among providers of residential and nursing 119 
home care in England is strong? Over 50% of care homes in England are operated by 120 
owners that run four or fewer facilities.  There are no major brands in the residential care 121 
market in England (LaingBuisson 2014), while the median size of these facilities is 23 beds.  122 
These factors imply low barriers to entry into the market, which reinforces the expectation 123 
that the market should be very competitive (Porter 1980).  Forder and Allan (2014) 124 
conducted an analysis of competition in the care homes market in England.  While they did 125 
indeed find that there was evidence of competition, they also showed that this can have the 126 
surprising consequence of reducing quality because homes will find it harder to attract self-127 
payers (who generally pay higher prices) while allowing the local authorities to push the 128 
prices they pay down.  If for-profit providers are less concerned with quality, then it would 129 
be expected that quality will be lower in for-profit facilities even in the presence of 130 
competition. 131 
In any event, competition will only have an impact if potential service users can accurately 132 
assess the quality of care they will receive, and if existing users are able to switch providers 133 
if they are dissatisfied.  One reason why this may be problematic is that it may be difficult 134 
for people to evaluate the quality of facilities before they have moved in.  People often 135 
move in to residential care in a time of crisis, such as the death of a spouse or deteriorating 136 
health, so they may find it difficult to visit candidate facilities in advance, and they may be 137 
relying on other people (such as family members) to choose for them.  Even if pre-138 
admission visits are possible, it is difficult to evaluate what the experience of living in a 139 
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facility will be like during a short visit.  This might not matter as much if it were easy for 140 
people to move to a different facility if they are unhappy with their first choice, but we 141 
know that such moves are very rare in practice, in part because of concerns for the adverse 142 
impact of such moves (Grabowski and Hirth 2003).  Under such circumstances, the 143 
incentive to compete on quality may be attenuated, with price becoming a more important 144 
factor in the minds of potential residents (Forder and Allan 2011).  In addition, for-profit 145 
homes may have an incentive to reduce quality so as to reduce costs and hence increase 146 
returns to owners.  This reasoning leads to the hypothesis that the quality of care provided 147 
in facilities owned by for-profit providers will, on average, be lower than that provided by 148 
facilities operated by a public authority or non-profit organization. 149 
However, this ignores the role played by the industry regulator, which in England is the 150 
Care Quality Commission (CQC).  The regulator may have an impact in two ways.  First, 151 
their inspection regime and ability to enforce standards of care may result in a reduction in 152 
variation in the quality of care.  It is still possible that public and non-profit providers could 153 
be more likely to provide care that significantly exceeds the minimum standards required 154 
by the regulator, but regulation should provide a floor below which standards do not drop.  155 
Second, the CQC’s inspection reports and quality ratings are freely available to the public 156 
via the CQC’s own website and via third party websites that are intended to make it easier 157 
for people to locate residential and nursing care facilities in the geographical area of their 158 
choice.  As a result, the people searching for a care home may be better informed than they 159 
would have been before the widespread availability of regulatory inspection ratings via the 160 
internet. 161 
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We should also consider the possibility that there is variation in the degree to which users, 162 
or potential users, of residential care are well informed.  It may be that people who are able 163 
to access the internet, who are able to visit and compare facilities, or who are able to draw 164 
on the support and advice of family members and friends will be relatively well positioned 165 
to form accurate judgements about the relative quality of different facilities, while others 166 
who are not in this position will be less well informed.  Arrow (1963) argued that many 167 
people who find it difficult to assess a facility’s quality will prefer non-profit or public 168 
sector providers because such organizations will be perceived to be motivated to deliver 169 
high quality care, with no conflict of interest caused by the pressure to deliver returns to 170 
investors.  If so, then it follows that for-profit providers will be competing for users who are 171 
better informed than average, and this will force them to maintain quality.  In other words, 172 
competition from non-profit and publicly operated facilities plays an important function in 173 
influencing the quality of for-profit providers over and above that of straightforward 174 
competition among for-profit providers. 175 
These arguments are all consistent with the hypothesis that for-profit operated facilities 176 
will tend to have lower quality, although such tendencies may be mitigated by the existence 177 
of a regulator and competition. However, in the presence of a competitive market and well-178 
informed customers it is possible that for-profit care homes that are part of a large 179 
corporate group could offer superior quality to non-profit or for-profit facilities run by 180 
small organizations if there are significant economies of scale.  There is evidence of 181 
economies of scale at the level of individual facilities (Christensen 2004; Farsi and Filippini 182 
2004; Hoess et al. 2009), although these are modest, certainly at the scales typical in the 183 
UK.  Even larger facilities tend to be organized into separate “wings”, and so economies of 184 
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scale are limited (LaingBuison 2014).  Furthermore, at least one study has suggested that 185 
firms have used this as a way of offering reduced prices rather than increases in quality in 186 
care homes in the UK (Forder and Allan 2011).  There may, however, be multi-unit 187 
economies of scale associated with the increasing size of residential care groups.  Evidence 188 
on this is mixed (Baum 1999).  For example, Cohen and Dubay (1990) find chain facilities 189 
reported lower costs, but other studies have failed to find similar evidence (Chen and Shea 190 
2004). Given this weak evidence, we would still expect that for-profit providers will be of 191 
equal or lower quality than those in the non-profit sector. 192 
Literature review 193 
There is little existing evidence on quality differences in health and social care provision 194 
between public, non-profit and for-profit providers in the UK, although there is a significant 195 
literature from elsewhere, especially the US.  Recent evidence suggests that there is no 196 
difference in the quality of patient care provided by NHS and for-profit hospitals in the UK 197 
when one controls for the fact that NHS patients being treated in hospitals operated by for-198 
profit providers are generally receiving routine care (Perotin et al. 2013).  In the case of 199 
care homes, Gage et al. (2009) analysed quality among a set of care and nursing homes in a 200 
single English county (N = 245).  Relative to non-profit and public providers (which they 201 
combined into a single group), they found some evidence of higher quality in homes run by 202 
for-profit providers that were part of a group of three or more homes, but lower quality 203 
among other for-profit homes.  Forder and Allan’s (2014) analysis of the impact of 204 
competition in the English care homes market found that for-profit providers were 205 
associated with lower levels of both quality and price than voluntary sector homes. 206 
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Looking beyond the UK, Comondore et al. (2009) conducted a systematic review and meta-207 
analysis of research comparing the quality of care in for-profit and not-for-profit nursing 208 
homes. Their review included 82 articles, of which 72 were from the United States. Of the 209 
82 studies, 40 showed greater quality of care in the not-for-profit sector, but a further 37 210 
studies were unable to reach conclusions either way. Only three studies found clear 211 
evidence for higher quality in the for-profit sector.  In Europe, Stolt, et al. (2011) conducted 212 
a study comparing public and private for-profit residential care provision in Sweden.  Their 213 
results showed that public sector facilities generally had better “input” measures of quality, 214 
such as staffing levels. However, aspects of service, such as residents being involved in the 215 
formulation of their care plan, favoured private contractors. 216 
Hypothesis: 217 
The quality of residential and nursing care homes operated by for-profit providers will be 218 
lower than those operated by public authorities and/or non-profit organizations, controlling 219 
for a range of other variables that are associated with quality. 220 
Data and methods 221 
The data we analyse were provided by LaingBuisson, specialist consultants in this field. 222 
They compile data on registered care homes in the UK, a total of 19,721 facilities.  The data 223 
set contains, among other fields, whether the provider is a local authority, non-profit or for-224 
profit organization; and the results of the most recent CQC inspection, if any.  As the CQC is 225 
only responsible for inspecting facilities in England, analysis is restricted to this subset of 226 
homes.  There are 16,761 facilities in total, but missing data reduces the number of homes 227 
available for analysis; actual numbers are shown in the tables of results.  These facilities are 228 
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all those registered to provide care to adults, of which 9,678 are primarily registered to 229 
provide care to people with dementia or over 64 years of age; 5,256 for adults with 230 
learning disabilities; and 1,252 for adults with mental health problems.  We carried out 231 
additional analyses that used only homes for older people; results are substantively similar 232 
to those reported below. 233 
Quality of care measure 234 
The outcome measures used in this paper are derived from the CQC’s inspection reports.  235 
The most recent report available for each home is used in the analysis; the earliest report is 236 
dated 4 April 2011 while the most recent is dated 14 October 2015.  CQC inspections of 237 
residential adult social care services are carried out by means of unannounced visits by 238 
inspectors.  These visits are informed by quantitative indicators, including incidence of 239 
pressure sores, medication errors and falls; these are treated as indicators of possible risks 240 
to be investigated rather than as the basis for inspection ratings.  The inspections use a 241 
range of evidence gathered by means of interviews with residents and staff, observations of 242 
care, reviews of records and care plans, inspections of the physical environment, and a 243 
review of documents and policies.  Each inspection results in the production of a report, 244 
publicly available on the CQC website.  Details of the inspection methods are available from 245 
the CQC (2016a).  The results of CQC inspections are currently the only feasible way of 246 
comparing the quality of all the facilities in the population of English residential and 247 
nursing homes.  Inspection outcomes are summarised by giving each facility a rating on five 248 
fundamental standards. These are: 249 
1. Is the service safe? Are the residents protected from abuse and avoidable harm? 250 
2. Is the service effective? Residents receive care that achieves good outcomes, helps 251 
maintain quality of life and is based on the best available evidence. 252 
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3. Is the service caring? Staff involve residents and treat them with compassion, 253 
kindness, dignity and respect. 254 
4. Is the service responsive to people’s needs? Services are organized so that they 255 
meet the needs of residents. 256 
5. Is the service well-led? The leadership, management and governance of the 257 
organisation make sure it’s providing high-quality care that’s based around your 258 
individual needs, that it encourages learning and innovation, and that it promotes an 259 
open and fair culture. 260 
Details of how each of these standards are evaluated are provided by the CQC (2016a).  261 
Each of the five standards is sub-divided into a number of key questions that the inspection 262 
team is required to answer.  For example, when evaluating the safety of care, inspectors 263 
have to ask “How are people protected from bullying?”, “How are risks to individuals and 264 
the service managed so that people are protected and their freedom is supported and 265 
respected?”,  “How does the service make sure that there are sufficient numbers of suitable 266 
staff to keep people safe and meet their needs?”, and “How are people’s medicines managed 267 
so that they receive them safely?” 268 
Each of these five standards is each given one of four ratings: Outstanding (“the service is 269 
performing exceptionally well”); Good (“the service is performing well and meeting 270 
expectations”); Requires improvement (“the service isn’t performing as well as it should, 271 
and has been told how it must improve”); or Inadequate (“the service is performing badly, 272 
and enforcement action has been taken”). By law, these ratings have to be displayed in the 273 
residential care facility where they can easily be seen, and they also have to be shown on 274 
the facility’s website. 275 
One possible critique of these ratings is that they involve an element of subjectivity, which 276 
some might consider a disadvantage relative to studies that draw on quantitatiave 277 
measures.  For example, Comondore et al. (2009) describe 24 studies of nursing home 278 
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quality that use pressure ulcer prevalence as the quality measure, 21 that measure the use 279 
of physical restraints, and 4 that use mortality.  However, inspector ratings are based on a 280 
very wide range of information sources, which includes quantitative records, but 281 
importantly also draw on direct observation and obtaining the views of residents and their 282 
families.  Therefore, the inspector ratings are based on much richer sources of data than 283 
are those that use simple quantitative measures.  There remains the possibility that ratings 284 
are influenced by conscious or unconscious biases among inspectors.  The CQC guards 285 
against this by means of independent quality assurance panels that look at samples of 286 
inspection judgements to check consistency.  It is worth bearing in mind that quantitative 287 
outcome measures are likely to be associated with the level of residents’ needs and 288 
therefore it would be problematic to use such measures without robust controls for the 289 
level of needs, which are not available for UK care homes. 290 
While the above describes the current CQC rating system, there was an earlier inspection 291 
regime, which rated what were called essential standards. Currently, more than half of the 292 
most recent inspections available to us used these earlier standards, so we also use these 293 
ratings in our analysis. The previous assessment criteria were grouped into five chapters: 294 
1. Standards of caring for people safely & protecting them from harm. 295 
2. Standards of staffing. 296 
3. Standards of treating people with respect and involving them in their care. 297 
4. Standards of providing care, treatment & support which meets people’s needs. 298 
5. Standards of quality & suitability of management. 299 
Each of these five “chapters” was give one of three ratings: All standards met; At least one 300 
standard not met; At least one standard not being met requiring enforcement action. 301 
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In addition to separate analyses of the facilities that have old and new-style inspection 302 
ratings, we also combine them so that we can analyse the entire set of care facilities.  To do 303 
this, we have to make the two inspection regimes consistent by coding them both into three 304 
categories: Good, which includes the “Outstanding” as well as the “Good” category in the 305 
new system, and is equivalent to “all standards met” in the old system; Poor, which includes 306 
“requires improvement” from the new system and ”at least one standard not met” under 307 
the old regime; Inadequate, which, as well as the category of this name in the new regime 308 
also includes “at least one standard requiring enforcement action” from the old standards. 309 
We carry out three sets of analyses, one based on facilities that were subject to the older 310 
rating system; one based on the new inspection system; and a third that combines all 311 
facilities using the three-category system described above. 312 
It is worth noting that none of these ratings can strictly be considered a measure of 313 
resident outcomes, although there is evidence that outcome measures are related to the 314 
‘old’ inspection ratings (Netten et al. 2010, p. 85).  Nevertheless, this is a limitation of the 315 
study. 316 
Explanatory variables 317 
The key explanatory variable is the type of owner of the establishment. This variable has 318 
three categories: local authority; private for-profit; private non-profit. Other explanatory 319 
variable are the number of beds in the facility; its age since first registration; whether or 320 
not the building was purpose-built as a care home; whether the establishment is classified 321 
as a ‘care home with nursing’ or a ‘care home without nursing’; and whether the primary 322 
registered client group is people suffering from dementia.  The latter variable is included 323 
because it is known that homes find it more challenging to provide a good quality of life for 324 
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residents suffering a significant degree of cognitive impairment (West 2016). We also 325 
control for the size of the over-65 population in the local authority area in which the facility 326 
is located as a measure of the size of demand for residential care in the local area.  The level 327 
of competition is measured using the Herfindahl index at the level of the local authority 328 
responsible for the purchase of care for the area in which the home is located.  The level of 329 
deprivation in the area served by the home is measured using the Income Deprivation 330 
Affecting Older People (IDAOP) score. (Department for Communities and Local 331 
Government 2015). 332 
Methods of analysis 333 
As the outcome variables are ordinal, with four categories for inspections using the new 334 
system and three categories for those based on the older system, the natural method of 335 
analysis is ordinal logistic regression (Agresti 2013). The simplest form of this method is 336 
proportional odds logistic regression: 337 
 logitPr	
 ≤ | =  + 
,  = 1,… ,  − 1 (1) 
In this model, there are  categories in the outcome variable, and a separate intercept () 338 
for each logit. The estimated effect of explanatory variables, , given by the vector of 339 
regression parameter estimates, , is the same for each logit.  We tested this assumption 340 
using the procedure recommended by Harrell (2001, p. 335).  Where appropriate, we 341 
relaxed the assumption and obtained separate estimates of the  parameters associated 342 
with sector for each logit, known as the partial proportional odds model (Peterson and 343 
Harrell 1990).  Whichever estimate is appropriate is reported in the tables of results shown 344 
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below. Estimates were obtained using the clm function in the ordinal package (Christensen 345 
2015) in R 3.3.2 (R Core Team 2016).  346 
Results 347 
Descriptive statistics 348 
Figure 1 shows how the care home industry in the UK has changed since 1970.  Over 65% 349 
of the available places were provided by local authorities in 1975, but 40 years later this 350 
was down to 8%.  While the proportion of places provided by non-profit providers has 351 
remained quite constant, over the same period the for-profit sector’s share of the industry 352 
has increased from less than 15% to almost three-quarters of the total number of beds. 353 
[Figure 1 about here] 354 
Tables 1 and 2 show cross tabulations of the numbers of establishments that received each 355 
of the available inspection outcomes using the old and new systems, respectively, along 356 
with the counts that would be expected if CQC quality rating was independent of ownership 357 
type (Agresti 2013).  We can see that in table 1, there are approximately 41 more non-358 
profit owned homes that are fully compliant than would be expected, while there are 359 
almost exactly the same number fewer for-profit homes that receive this CQC rating.  360 
Similarly, we can see that there are about 37 fewer non-profit homes that have at least one 361 
area of non-compliance about a similar number more for-profit homes than would be 362 
expected.   363 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 364 
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Table 2 shows a similar pattern.  Among homes that achieve all ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ CQC 365 
ratings, there are about 116 more non-profit homes than would be expected and 130 fewer 366 
for-profit homes.  At the other end of the scale, among those homes that have at least one 367 
‘inadequate’ rating, there are 64 more for-profit homes than would be expected under the 368 
independence model and 52 more non-profit homes.  In both tables, local authority homes 369 
achieve a distribution of ratings that is close to what would be expected under the null 370 
model of independence.  Descriptive statistics for other explanatory variables are shown in 371 
table 3. 372 
[Table 3 about here] 373 
Regression results 374 
Although the contingency tables suggest that there are differences in quality among the 375 
three ownership types, this form of analysis does not control for the inclusion of other 376 
variables that might affect the relationship between ownership type and quality of care.  377 
We therefore present three sets of ordinal regression results.  The first set, shown in table 378 
4, are based on the old inspection regimes, while the second set (table 5) use the new type 379 
of quality rating as outcome variable and the third set (table 6) combines the two as 380 
described above. The parameter estimates in the table are shown on the logit scale (as in 381 
equation 1, above).  Odds ratios can be obtained by exponentiating the estimates in the 382 
tables.  For example, the estimate of the parameter associated with Not-for-profit in 383 
column (1) of table 4 is 0.614; exp	0.614 = 1.85, which implies that the odds of all 384 
standards being met relative to any of the other ratings is 1.85 times greater for not-for-385 
profit facilities compared to for-profit operators.  Figure 2 shows the marginal effects of 386 
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sector on quality rating evaluated at the mean values of quantitative variables and the most 387 
common category of categorical variables. 388 
Old inspection regime 389 
Turning first to the old inspection regime results, we can see in table 4 that non-profit 390 
homes have consistently higher quality ratings than for-profit homes (which is the 391 
excluded category in all the tables), across all five of the inspection criteria.  The advantage 392 
is particularly marked in the case of standards of staffing.  Although the estimates for local 393 
authorities are mostly positive, the difference between their quality ratings and those of 394 
for-profit homes are not statistically significant. 395 
[Table 4 about here] 396 
As regards the other variables, homes that do not provide nursing care mostly have slightly 397 
better quality ratings, but the differences are not statistically significant.  Quality of care 398 
tends to decline as the number of beds in a home increases, but only two of the coefficients 399 
are significant (staffing and needs).  The signs on the age of the care home variable are all 400 
negative, implying that older homes tends to be rated as of lower quality, but only three are 401 
significant, with “respect” being the largest estimate. Whether or not the home was 402 
purpose built seems to have little effect on quality of care, which is somewhat surprising 403 
giving results of previous studies showing that purpose built homes tend to have higher 404 
quality (Forder and Allan 2014).  Homes that provide dementia care tend to have lower 405 
quality ratings, although mostly these are not statistically significant.  Overall, the most 406 
important impact on quality is whether or not the care is a “not-for-profit” organization, 407 
which is associated with highly significant, positive coefficients on each of the measures of 408 
quality.   409 
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New inspection regime 410 
Regression results using the new inspection system’s quality ratings as outcome variable 411 
are shown in table 5.  Using the new inspection regime, non-profit homes again 412 
significantly out-perform their for-profit counterparts.  This time, though, we can see that 413 
local authority run facilities are also likely to have a higher quality rating than those run by 414 
for-profit operators, at least on some of the quality criteria.  Whereas in the previous table, 415 
the distinction between residential and nursing home quality was not significant, all five 416 
coefficients are positive and significant for residential care, implying that homes that 417 
provide nursing care are less likely to obtain good CQC inspection ratings, perhaps because 418 
it is more challenging to recruit and retain professionally qualified staff..  419 
Once again, the probability of obtaining better CQC ratings declines as the number of beds 420 
in a home increases.  For-profit homes are, on average, larger (a mean of 26.9 beds) than 421 
local authority (24.5) or non-profit (21.7) facilities. We can also see that, based on the more 422 
recent inspections, older homes also tend to have lower quality ratings from the CQC, as do 423 
homes that provide dementia care.  424 
[Table 5 about here] 425 
Combining quality measures 426 
In this final set of results, we combine the two types of quality inspection systems into a 427 
single response variable, as described above. The benefit of this is the increase in sample 428 
size, although we need to be slightly cautious as the five components of the two different 429 
inspection systems are not identical. These results are shown in table 6. Once again we see 430 
that local authority and private non-profit facilities are significantly more likely to receive 431 
better quality ratings from the CQC than for-profit facilities; differences between local 432 
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authority and not-for-profit providers are not statistically significant.  Providing residential 433 
as opposed to nursing care is again associated with higher quality.  Smaller and newer 434 
homes are also more likely to be highly rated by the regulator.  By way of illustration, the 435 
probability of a for-profit, 20-bedded home being rated “Good” or “Outstanding” for the 436 
Safety category (column 1 in table 6) is 0.85, while the corresponding probability for a 60-437 
bedded facility is 0.75.  For the same category, a five year old home has a probability of 438 
being rated “Good” or “Outstanding” of 0.88, while the corresponding probability for a 30 439 
year old home is 0.80.  Whether or not a care home is purpose built shows negative signs 440 
across all five coefficients, but only three are significant.  Caring for patients with dementia 441 
is once again negative and significant in relation to lower quality of care.  Homes that have 442 
a primary client code of Dementia have a probability of a “Good” or “Outstanding” rating in 443 
the Safety category 0.79 compared to 0.84 for those with other primary client codes. 444 
[Table 6 about here] 445 
To illustrate the scale of the effects, using the mean values of control variables, the 446 
predicted probabilities of being in each of the three rating categories based on this final set 447 
of regression parameter estimates are shown in the set of effect plots in figure 2.   This 448 
graphically illustrates the lower probability of For-profit providers obtaining the best CQC 449 
ratings and their higher probability of being rated “Poor”. 450 
[Figure 2 about here] 451 
Discussion 452 
We have shown that, based on the inspection ratings of the care home regulator, care 453 
homes and nursing homes that are operated by non-profit organizations and those that are 454 
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run by local authorities are, on average, of higher quality than those operated by for-profit 455 
providers. There is, however, no clear difference in quality between facilities operated by 456 
non-profit organisations or local authorities. These differences are found across all five of 457 
the components of quality rated by the CQC and using information on quality provided by 458 
the old and the new inspection regimes. This is consistent with the hypothesis that quality 459 
differences exist because quasi-market competition is attenuated by the difficulty people 460 
have in evaluating the quality of provision and/or transferring out of a facility that they 461 
find inadequate once they become resident there. The fact that these differences are 462 
relatively small suggests that the regulator is having the effect of reducing these quality 463 
differences by ensuring standards are maintained and/or by increasing the availability of 464 
information to potential service users. 465 
Of course, it does not necessarily follow that standards of care in for-profit facilities are 466 
bad. Indeed, the majority of homes of all types are rated good or better by the CQC. Most 467 
care home places are provided by the for-profit sector, and these results do not suggest 468 
that this is the source of a quality problem. What’s more, the reason for the predominance 469 
of the for-profit sector is presumably that they are able to access the capital needed to build 470 
new facilities. 471 
We might ask whether there are any general lessons for the operation of quasi-markets. 472 
The provision of residential and nursing home care is closer to a conventional market than 473 
any of the other quasi-markets that have been developed in the UK public service sector in 474 
that there is a large amount of choice available to users, many of the service providers are 475 
in the private sector, and many users pay for their own care in full or in part. This contrasts 476 
sharply with the quasi-market that now operates in the NHS, where almost all providers 477 
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remain in the public sector and purchasing is carried out by Clinical Commissioning 478 
Groups. Choice in the NHS is mainly exercised by CCGs during the tendering process, but 479 
patients in the main still have little choice about where they receive treatment. It should 480 
follow that the benefits of efficiency, responsiveness and choice that are purported to 481 
derive from the operation of quasi-markets will be more likely to be evident in this sector 482 
than in the other public service quasi-markets in the UK. There is certainly evidence that 483 
quasi-markets promote efficiency in the sense of lower costs, which have been shown to be 484 
significantly lower in both the non-profit and for-profit sectors when compared to local 485 
authority facilities (Nyman et al. 1990; Boyne 1998; Chen 2004).  And the large number of 486 
homes offering care suggests that there is plenty of choice. It is less clear that 487 
responsiveness to the needs of service users has improved, but at least quality of care, in 488 
the main, seems to be reasonable. However, it is clear that maintaining this level of quality 489 
would be unlikely in the absence of a regulator, which is necessary to protect the public 490 
because of the difficulty they would face evaluating care quality themselves. The cost of the 491 
regulator has, then, to be counted against the benefits produced by introducing the quasi-492 
market.  In addition, the large number of private providers introduces an element of risk 493 
into the system of care provision; private providers—both for-profit and non-profit—are 494 
more vulnerable to the risk of failure than their public sector counterparts.  We have 495 
already seen the failure of one large-scale provider of residential care—Southern Cross—in 496 
2011, and a number of current providers suffer from “excessive debt” overhangs, leaving 497 
them vulnerable to increases in debt servicing costs from changes in interest rates or credit 498 
ratings (LaingBuisson 2014).  At the same time, there is evidence that the risk of failure in 499 
the face of competition is higher among voluntary sector providers than those in the for-500 
profit sector (Allan and Forder 2015).  However, it is the potential failure of another large 501 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
23 
 
group provider that prompts most concern, and there are increasing concerns about the 502 
financial health of some of the major for-profit providers of residential and nursing home 503 
care in the UK in the face of increasing costs.  This has led to the CCQ being required to also 504 
assess the financial sustainability of care organizations that local authorities would find it 505 
hard to replace, a function that presumably adds to the cost of ensuring that this quasi-506 
market functions effectively.  Regulation of providers is increasingly funded by fees 507 
charged to providers by the CQC, and indeed the UK government expects this function to 508 
become fully paid for out of provider fees in future.  At the same time, the CQC’s budget is 509 
expected to fall from £249m in 2015/16 to £217m in 2019/20 (Care Quality Commission 510 
2016b).  Given that, even with all the desirable characteristics of the market and the 511 
substantial sums spent on regulation, we still observe lower quality among for-profit 512 
providers of residential and nursing home care might imply that we should be very 513 
cautious about moving further in this direction in other areas of public service provision. 514 
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Tables 580 
Table 1. The number of establishments of each ownership type based on the old 581 
compliance regime (expected values in parentheses). 582 
 At least one 
enforcement 
action 
At least one 
area of non-
compliance 
Fully compliant Totals 
For-profit 15 
(11.5) 
473 
(435.0) 
6142 
(6183.5) 
6630 
Local 
authority 
1 
(0.7) 
27 
(27.7) 
394 
(393.6) 
422 
Non-profit 0 
(3.7) 
103 
(140.3) 
2036 
(1994.9) 
2139 
Totals 16 603 8572 9191 
Chi-square (4 degrees of freedom): 19.2; p-value < 0.01 583 
 584 
 585 
Table 2. The number of establishments of each ownership type based on the new 586 
compliance regime. 587 
 At least one 
inadequate area 
At least one area 
requiring 
improvement 
All areas good 
or outstanding 
Totals 
For-profit 484 
(420.1) 
2509 
(2442.7) 
1883 
(2013.2) 
4876 
Local 
authority 
4 
(15.4) 
87 
(89.7) 
88 
(73.9) 
179 
Non-profit 42 
(94.5) 
486 
(549.6) 
569 
(452.9) 
1097 
Totals 530 3082 2540 6152 
Chi-square (4 degrees of freedom): 97.4; p-value < 0.01. 588 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics. 590 
Registration code  
Care home without nursing 72.0% 
Care home with nursing 28.0% 
Purpose built  
Yes 25.7% 
No 74.3% 
Dementia care registration  
Yes 10.0% 
No 90.0% 
 591 
 Mean Standard deviation 
Beds 27.8 23.0 
Age (years) 19.8 8.3 
Over 65 population (millions) 0.040 0.027 
Herfindahl index 0.016 0.019 
IDOAP score 0.180 0.110 
  592 
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Table 4. Ordinal logistic regression results using old inspection ratings, standard errors in 593 
parentheses. 594 
 Safety Staffing Respect Needs Management 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Local Authority 0.068 0.401 0.096 -0.23 -0.049 
 
(0.473) (0.427) (0.319) (0.327) (0.277) 
Non-for-Profit 0.614* 1.05* 0.443* 0.533* 0.437* 
 
(0.287) (0.269) (0.172) (0.221) (0.162) 
Home without nursing 0.311 0.189 0.282 -0.010 0.191 
 
(0.238) (0.192) (0.156) (0.197) (0.149) 
Beds / 1000 -6.47 -10.4* -4.33 -11.0* -5.16 
 
(5.15) (3.95) (3.55) (3.98) (3.32) 
Age (years) -0.023* -0.011 -0.028* -0.017 -0.018* 
 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) 
Purpose Built -0.264 -0.157 0.028 -0.357 -0.062 
 
(0.240) (0.196) (0.164) (0.188) (0.151) 
Dementia care -0.454 -0.435* -0.150 -0.196 -0.106 
 
(0.276) (0.218) (0.203) (0.239) (0.194) 
Over 65 population 8.17 -0.417 0.398 5.24 -1.01 
  (millions) (4.44) (2.95) (2.34) (3.26) (2.12) 
IDAOP  -0.627 0.184 -0.352 -0.480 -0.286 
 
(0.897) (0.730) (0.579) (0.724) (0.547) 
Herfindahl  0.657 -4.23 1.22 6.58 3.91 
 
(5.93) (4.49) (4.04) (5.49) (4.08) 
Enforcement action |  -8.91* -7.94* -7.32* -8.32* -7.17* 
Standard not met (1.12) (0.699) (0.488) (0.709) (0.461) 
Standard not met | -4.17* -3.84* -3.73* -4.21* -3.57* 
All standards met (0.508) (0.402) (0.342) (0.417) (0.323) 
Observations 9191 9191 9191 9191 9191 
Log likelihood -600.3 -861.9 -1277.7 -878.7 -1404.1 
Note: * = p < 0.05  595 
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Table 5. Ordinal logistic regression results using new inspection ratings, standard errors in parentheses. 596 
 Safe Effective Caring Needs Leadership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Local Authority 1 0.506* 1.75 0.655* 0.477* 0.811 
 (0.173) (1.01) (0.257) (0.191) (0.510) 
Local Authority 2 
 
0.127 
  
0.450* 
 
 
(0.170) 
  
(0.176) 
Local Authority 3 
 
-0.121 
  
0.246 
 
 
(1.04) 
  
(0.744) 
Not-for-Profit 1 0.446* 1.51* 0.579* 0.640* 1.43* 
 (0.074) (0.341) (0.108) (0.084) (0.267) 
Not-for-Profit 2 
 
0.539* 
  
0.660* 
 
 
(0.079) 
  
(0.078) 
Not-for-Profit 3 
 
-0.382 
  
0.831* 
 
 
(0.542) 
  
(0.289) 
Home without nursing 0.197* 0.204* 0.236* 0.270* 0.179* 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.088) (0.070) (0.067) 
Beds / 1000 -13.82* -11.9* -12.7* -12.4* -6.93* 
 (1.29) (1.32) (1.59) (1.36) (1.30) 
Age (years) -0.024* -0.021* -0.015* -0.021* -0.019* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Purpose Built 0.080 0.001 0.032 -0.038 -0.016 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.088) (0.071) (0.067) 
Dementia care -0.206* -0.238* -0.303* -0.220* -0.202* 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.098) (0.082) (0.079) 
Over 65 population -0.196 -1.67 3.03* -0.053 -1.41 
  (millions) (0.978) (0.999) (1.38) (1.06) (0.982) 
IDAOPI  -0.303 0.017 -0.065 -0.111 -0.121 
 (0.248) (0.259) (0.335) (0.270) (0.253) 
Herfindahl  -1.08 2.80 2.14 1.61 2.80* 
 (1.18) (1.42) (1.56) (1.43) (1.33) 
Inadequate |  -3.31* -3.73* -4.71* -4.14* -3.15* 
Requires improvement (0.147) (0.158) (0.219) (0.169) (0.150) 
Requires improvement | -0.905* -0.944* -1.89* -1.12* -0.746* 
Good (0.138) (0.142) (0.181) (0.148) (0.139) 
Good | 6.88* 4.91* 4.21* 4.42* 4.61* 
Outstanding (0.519) (0.250) (0.205) (0.193) (0.218) 
Observations 6075 6073 6071 6074 6072 
Log likelihood -5117.8 -4711.5 -3115.2 -4397.1 -5099.9 
Note: * = p < 0.05 597 
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Table 6. Ordinal logistic regression results combining both inspection ratings, standard 598 
errors in parentheses.  599 
 
Safety/ 
Safe 
Staffing/ 
Effective 
Respect/ 
Caring Needs 
Management/ 
Leadership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Local Authority 1 2.10* 2.11* 0.917 0.529* 1.16* 
 
(0.721) (1.00) (1.01) (0.159) (0.505) 
Local Authority 2 0.637* 0.422* 0.728* 0.533* 
 
(0.146) (0.141) (0.233) (0.139) 
Not-for-Profit 1 0.929* 1.71* 1.33* 0.689* 1.62* 
 
(0.176) (0.341) (0.515) (0.075) (0.265) 
Not-for-Profit 2 0.508* 0.649* 0.615* 0.668* 
 
(0.063) (0.068) (0.097) (0.066) 
Home without nursing 0.278* 0.268* 0.325* 0.295* 0.256* 
 
(0.054) (0.056) (0.076) (0.060) (0.055) 
Beds / 1000 -16.4* -15.3* -14.6* -16.0* -11.2* 
 
(1.08) (1.12) (1.41) (1.17) (1.10) 
Age (years) -0.026* -0.023* -0.023* -0.024* -0.022* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Purpose Built -0.042 -0.094 -0.045 -0.143* -0.092 
 
(0.055) (0.057) (0.078) (0.061) (0.056) 
Dementia care -0.307* -0.329* -0.339* -0.317* -0.276* 
 
(0.065) (0.066) (0.087) (0.070) (0.066) 
Over 65 population -0.303 -1.80* 1.31 0.141 -1.66* 
  (millions) (0.835) (0.845) (1.23) (0.941) (0.815) 
IDAOPI  -0.232 0.002 -0.120 -0.145 -0.170 
 
(0.205) (0.215) (0.297) (0.232) (0.208) 
Herfindahl  -4.28* -1.63 0.668 -0.867 -0.625 
 
(1.08) (1.17) (1.87) (1.34) (1.22) 
Inadequate| Poor -4.19* -4.70* -5.64* -5.13* -4.17* 
 
(0.126) (0.138) (0.201) (0.151) (0.129) 
Poor| Good -2.15* -2.15* -2.79* -2.35* -1.95* 
 (0.116) (0.120) (0.161) (0.129) (0.117) 
Observations 15266 15264 15262 15265 15263 
Log likelihood -7842.7 -7040.9 -4153.6 -6176.6 -7656.7 
Note: * = p < 0.05 600 
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Figures 602 
 603 
Figure 1. Area plot showing the proportion of care homes operated by local authorities, 604 
non-profit organizations and for-profit firms, 1970-2014 605 
  606 
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a) Safety/Safe 
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d) Needs 
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Figure 2. Effect plots 607 
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• Study of quality of care homes for adults in England. 
• Care is delivered by public, not-for-profit and for-profit providers. 
• Quality of care is significantly lower among for-profit providers. 
• Non-profit providers have the highest quality. 
• Differences in quality are relatively small, so regulation may be effective 
